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Abstract. Cyber security is always a main concern for critical infrastructures 
and nation-wide safety and sustainability. Thus, advanced cyber ranges and se-
curity training is becoming imperative for the involved organizations. This pa-
per presets a cyber security training platform, called THREAT-ARREST. The 
various platform modules can analyze an organization’s system, identify the 
most critical threats, and tailor a training program to its personnel needs. Then, 
different training programmes are created based on the trainee types (i.e. admin-
istrator, simple operator, etc.), providing several teaching procedures and ac-
complishing diverse learning goals. One of the main novelties of THREAT-
ARREST is the modelling of these programmes along with the runtime moni-
toring, management, and evaluation operations. The platform is generic. Never-
theless, its applicability in a smart energy case study is detailed. 
Keywords: Security Training, Cyber Range, Training Programmes, Training 
Exercises, Dynamic Adaptation, CTTP, Smart Grid, Smart Energy. 
1 Introduction 
Massive advancements in computer technologies have given rise to a cyber-
infrastructure enabling the acquisition, storage, sharing, integration, and processing of 
data, through distributed software services cutting across organizational and national 
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boundaries. It is estimated that up to 200 billion devices will be connected to the In-
ternet by 2020 (i.e. 26 connected objects per person [1]), while 5.5 million new 
“things” were being connected every day in 2016 alone. This cyber infrastructure has 
facilitated the development of complex interconnected cyber systems, supporting an 
ever-increasing spectrum of everyday personal, societal and business activities, mak-
ing modern society and enterprise increasingly dependent on them. 
The unprecedented levels of data sharing and cyber systems interoperability, and 
the complex compositional structures of cyber systems have also led to increasingly 
sophisticated, stealthy, targeted, and multi-faceted cyberattacks. The “cyber-war” 
against essential infrastructures around the globe has already been underway. Exam-
ples include attacks in airports and airlines [2], [3] government services (U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management [4]), health insurance companies and health providers [5]. 
Preserving the security of cyber systems is a particularly challenging problem [6], 
[7], [8]. This is due to the inherent difficulty of: (i) identifying vulnerabilities in the 
complex end-to-end compositions of heterogeneous components and devices of such 
systems, (ii) selecting appropriate security controls for them, and (iii) preserving end-
to-end security when dynamic changes occur in the components, the compositional 
structures and the infrastructures that they deploy. 
However, despite the importance of security training, the initiatives to “educate” 
enterprise personnel (particularly of SMEs) and make it realize the importance cyber-
security are limited [9], [10]. The provision of effective and comprehensive security 
training in organizations and enterprises is becoming even more important due to the 
sheer complexity of cyber systems that need to be secured and the ever-increasing 
number and level of sophistication of cyber-attacks [11], [12]. 
Even though at a first glance, the existence of a wide spectrum of security tools ap-
pears to provide a comprehensive machinery for detecting and responding effectively 
to cyber-attacks (e.g. [13], [14]), in reality the very existence of several alternative 
tools, targeting different aspects and layers of modern cyber systems and having dif-
ferent capabilities, makes it difficult to establish effective tool usage strategies and 
processes for addressing the ever-expanding landscape of cyber-attacks. Moreover, 
the advent of more “intelligent” cyber-security solutions [8], [13], which make use of 
technologies, like machine learning, statistical analysis and user behavior analysis, 
requires sophisticated and hands-on training of the key personnel of organizations, 
who have responsibility for security, for the latter to be able to master them. 
Overcoming the above difficulties requires the development of advanced security 
training frameworks to adequately prepare stakeholders with responsibility in defend-
ing high-risk computer systems and organizations to counter advanced cyber-attacks. 
A framework of this type must be able to accommodate and cover emerging security 
controls and tool innovations from different providers in a scalable manner (i.e. [7], 
[15]). It should also be supported by experience sharing [16], [17] and put emphasis 
on the human aspects of security. In this direction, technologies, such as serious gam-
ing (e.g. [18], [19], [20]), whose aim is to address security attacks launched through 
social engineering, get an important role, as one of the most effective ways to defend 
systems against attacks and train humans to resist social-engineering. 
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In response to these needs, the overall aim of THREAT-ARREST is to develop an 
advanced training platform incorporating emulation, simulation, serious gaming, and 
visualization capabilities to adequately prepare stakeholders with different types of 
responsibility and levels of expertise in defending high-risk cyber systems, and organ-
izations to counter advanced, known, and new cyber-attacks. The THREAT-ARREST 
platform will deliver security training, based on a model-driven approach where 
cyber threat and training preparation (CTTP) models, specifying the potential 
attacks, the security controls of cyber systems against them, and the tools that may be 
used to assess the effectiveness of these controls, will drive the training process, and 
align it (where possible) with operational cyber system security assurance mecha-
nisms to ensure the relevance of training. The platform will also support trainee per-
formance evaluation and training programme evaluation, and adapt training pro-
grammes based on them. The effectiveness of the framework will be validated on a 
real pilot system in the area of smart energy. 
The rest paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the related work in cyber 
security training landscape along with a qualitative comparison. Section 3 defines the 
CTTP modeling and its application on a smart energy scenario. Sections 4 details the 
platform architecture and the underlying modules for hybrid training, gamification, 
emulation, simulation, and visualization. Finally, Section 5 concludes this work. 
2 Related Work & Comparison 
Today, there are several research and commercial solutions for cyber security training 
for organizations or individuals. The most representative of them are reviewed below. 
Apart from the general-purpose online training platforms (e.g. Coursera Udacity, 
edX, etc.) that can provide main educational courses on cyber security, there are also 
specialized platforms, like the SANS [21], CyberInternAcademy [22], StationX [23], 
Cybrary [24], and AwareGO [25]. In most cases, they target individual stu-
dents/trainees whose goal is to develop/sharpen new skills. Nevertheless, these ap-
proaches fail when it comes to hands-on experience on real systems or cyber ranges. 
The German company BeOne Development has implement its own solution of se-
curity awareness training [26]. It includes e-learning modules, awareness videos, and 
simulation tools. For the former, the BePhished simulator is utilized, which is focused 
on phishing attacks. To facilitate the process for establishing new training exercises, 
they have also developed the Security Awareness Library which contains 28 learning 
topics. Multinational working environments and cultural differences are taken into 
account, as the training becomes more effective when used examples are recognized 
by employees from their own daily jobs. The product can offer pre-packaged and 
generic programs, organization-specific look and feel, or tailor-made programs that 
have been developed in close consultation with the customer. The overall approach 
supports general teaching processes for the main training, while the more advanced 
simulation-centric training targets phishing attempts. 
ISACA developed the CyberSecurity Nexus (CSX) training platform [27]. It pro-
vides instructional lectures and hands-on lab works on real equipment. The trainee 
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gets experience in applying basic concepts and industry-leading methods. Capture-
the-flag scenarios are also supported, advancing the trainee’s technical skills. The 
users are assessed and the goal is to earn a relevant professional certification. This 
would assist an organization’s chief information security officer (CISO) to hire em-
ployees with the right skills. 
Kaspersky offers advanced computer-based training programs for all organization-
al levels [28]. Except from online training, the platform supports benchmarking 
against world/industry averages, robust simulation, and true gamification. It builds an 
educational schedule and internal learning with constant reinforcement, offered auto-
matically through a blend of training formats, including learning modules, email rein-
forcement, tests, and simulated phishing attacks. It follows the trainees’ progress via a 
user-friendly dashboard, supporting live data tracking, trends, and forecasts. 
CyberBit was founded in 2015 and its cyber security training platform provides a 
realistic simulation of cyber-attacks in an environment that mirrors a real-life network 
and a security operations center (SOC) [29]. This cyber range solution is consisted of 
a virtual network (mirror of an actual system), an attack engine (malicious traffic), a 
traffic generator (legitimate data), and a virtual SOC (trainee’s viewpoint). The goal is 
to simulate hyper-realistic cyber ranges. The platform provides a high variety of train-
ing scenarios, such as incident response and pentesting. The trainers set up the train-
ing session which includes debriefing, session recording, trainee ranking, and scenario 
management. Scenario customization is also supported via a graphical interface. 
On the other hand, the THREAT-ARREST platform offers training on known 
and/or new advanced cyber-attack scenarios, taking different types of actions against 
them, including: preparedness, detection and analysis, incident response, and post 
incident response actions. The THREAT-ARREST platform supports the use of secu-
rity testing, monitoring and assessment tools at different layers in the implementation 
stack, including: 
─ Network layer tools (e.g. intrusion detection systems, firewalls, honey-
pots/honeynet) 
─ Infrastructure layer tools (e.g. security monitors, passive and active penetration 
testing tools (e.g. configuration testing, SSL/TLS testing) 
─ Application layer tools (e.g. security monitors, code analysis, as well as passive 
and active penetration testing tools such as authentication testing, database testing, 
session management testing, data validation & injection testing) 
The procedure begins by analyzing the organization’s system. An assurance tool 
evaluates the current security level and reports the most significant security issues that 
must drive the following training process. Then, hybrid training programmes are pro-
duced, tailored to the organization needs and the trainee types. This includes the main 
training material along with serious games, as well as, the simulation and emulation 
of the cyber range system. THREAT-ARREST also provides continuous evaluation 
of: (a) the performance of individual trainees in specific training programmes; and (b) 
the effectiveness of training programmes across sub-groups of trainees or the entire 
organization. These evaluations will be used to tailor programmes to the needs of 
individual trainees or alter them at a more macroscopic level. 
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The qualitative comparison results are summarized in Table 1. THREAT-
ARREST combines all modern training aspects of serious gaming, emulation, and 
simulation in a concrete manner, and offers continuous security assurance and pro-
gramme adaptation based on the trainee’s performance and skills. 
Table 1. Cyber-security training platforms: A) THREAT-ARREST, B) BeOne, C) Kaspersky, 
D) ISACA CSX, E) CyberBit, F) online training platforms. The following notations are utilized 
for (Y)es, (N)o, and (P)arial. 
Feature A 
 
B C D E F 
Automatic security vulnerability analysis of a pilot system Y N N N N N 
Multi-layer modelling Y P Y Y Y P 
Continuous security assurance Y N N Y Y N 
Serious gaming Y N Y Y N P 
Realistic simulation of cyber systems Y P Y Y Y N 
Combination of emulated and real equipment Y N P Y N N 
Programme runtime evaluation Y N N Y Y Y 
Programme runtime adaptation Y N Y Y N P 
3 CTTP Modelling 
3.1 Pilot System Modelling & Continuous Security Assurance 
One of the main novelties of the THREAT-ARREST approach is the modelling of the 
training process, the real-time assessment of the security features for an examined 
system, and the continuous evaluation of the trainer. 
The development of the THREAT-ARREST framework will be based on a model-
driven approach in which the delivery of cyber-threat training and preparation (CTTP) 
programmes will be driven by CTTP models. A CTTP model will define the structure 
and automate the development of a CTTP programme by determining: 
1. the components of a cyber-system, their relations and the cyber threats covered by 
the CTTP programme 
2. the ways in which these components should be simulated and emulated 
3. the ways in which cyber-attacks against the cyber system may manifest themselves 
4. the actions that trainees are expected to take against these attacks and the tools that 
may be used for this purpose, and 
5. targets regarding the preparedness and effectiveness level that the trainees targeted 
by a CTTP programme are expected to achieve and how these levels may be meas-
ured in different stages of the delivery of the programme. 
A CTTP model covers two key layers in the implementation of a cyber-system, 
i.e., the software architecture layer (SAL) and the physical architecture layer (PAL). It 
6 
also covers dependencies between components in SAL & PAL. The SAL part of the 
CTTP model is an application-level model of the cyber system, specifying the differ-
ent software components of it (e.g. data repositories and servers, client facing dash-
boards, clients and drivers running on external devices, etc.). SAL is specified by a 
SAL sub-model having the form of a typed directed graph. The nodes of this graph 
represent the software components of the cyber system and specify: (i) the type of the 
software component, (ii) any implementation dependencies that the component may 
have (e.g., on libraries and operating systems), and (iii) the key responses that the 
component produces upon input stimuli. Part (ii) is important for emulating the com-
ponent and part (iii) is important for simulating the component. The edges of the SAL 
model represent call, data and resource dependencies between components (e.g., data 
flows, access to shared memories). 
The PAL part of the CTTP model covers the network and the computational infra-
structure used by the cyber system. PAL is specified by a PAL sub-model, which is 
also a typed directed graph. The nodes of this graph represent the physical compo-
nents of the cyber system including, for example, computer servers, terminals, net-
work routers and controllers and other telecommunication components, surveillance 
equipment, sensors and devices that may be used by the system (e.g., external mobile 
devices, special hardware of industrial automation platforms, healthcare equipment or 
geolocation devices). PAL model nodes hold information about the properties of the 
physical component they represent. They describe, for example, the type of the physi-
cal component (e.g. desktop, server, routing device, etc.), the key responses that it 
produces upon input stimuli, and other general capabilities (e.g. number of CPU-
cores, storage and memory capabilities). The edges connecting the nodes of the PAL 
model represent the network-level topology of the cyber system and describe the con-
nection's type and properties such as IP address space, link rate, type of linkage (e.g. 
wireless, Ethernet, etc.). 
The CTTP model includes also specifications of two more important aspects that 
are necessary for the delivery of a CTTP programme. These are: 
(a) A deployment model specifying the allocation of the software (SAL) compo-
nents of the cyber system onto its physical (PAL) components. 
(b) An assurance model specifying known threats that may affect the physical or 
software components of the system; assumptions regarding the external environment 
of the cyber system and the behavior of agents (human- or system-agents) related to it 
that can affect it (i.e., prevent or enable threats); and security controls used to mitigate 
the risks arising from the threats. The assurance sub-model also specifies assessment 
measures, determining how to detect attacks arising from the threats and assess the 
effectiveness of the security controls. It also specifies the assessment tools that should 
be used to realize these measures prior to the deployment of the system (e.g., static 
analysis and testing tools) or during the operation of the system (monitoring and dy-
namic testing tools). It will also specify parameters determining how the attacks may 
manifest themselves, how the security controls may respond to them (e.g., the attack 
manifestation events captured and detection time, the undertaken response actions) 
and the outputs that the deployed assessment tools will generate for the situation. 
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3.2 Motivating Example – Smart Energy Home 
We demonstrate the application of CTTP modeling on a smart energy scenario, 
where energy is collected by solar panels installed in houses. The solution is provided 
by the Lightsource company in Ireland. Fig. 1 depicts the main application modules. 
 
Fig. 1. Smart energy system architecture 
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the PAL and SAL parts of the CTTP model of a smart ener-
gy metering cyber system for smart homes. As shown in Fig. 2, at the PAL layer, this 
cyber system consists of a number of smart-meters (i.e., SM-1, ... , SM-n), and a 
number of photovoltaic sensor devices (i.e., Sensor-1, ... , Sensor-n). The smart-
meters are connected to the Smart Meter Server while the sensors are connected to the 
Sensor Server for monitoring and management purposes. The two servers are con-
nected to the Main Server (Gateway), which is equipped with a hardware Security 
Device (i.e., trusted platform module (TPM) enabled host). The entire system is con-
nected to the internet via firewall equipment. 
As shown in Fig. 3, the SAL layer of the smart metering system consists of an ex-
ternal communication service, used by third party operators, and an internal commu-
nication service. The two services are connected and share a set of software security 
tools offering authentication and security monitoring. The external communication 
service interfaces with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), connecting the entire 
system to the Internet. The internal communication application is used for intercon-
necting the smart-meter monitoring and command service with the sensor monitoring 
and command service. The two monitoring and command services are used in order to 
collect information from the smart-meters and photovoltaic sensors, issue control 
commands and act as dashboards for data visualization. They also interface with the 
appropriate software and firmware solutions, driving the various sensors and smart-
meters, towards data and command exchange. Fig. 3 depicts the SAL layer as graph. 
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Fig. 2. PAL sub-model of the CTTP model of a smart metering system. 
 
Fig. 3. SAL sub-model of the CTTP model of a smart metering system. 
The deployment of SAL components onto PAL components is shown in Fig. 4. In 
particular, we can see that some PAL components are used in order to host a single 
SAL component, such as the firewall solution. Multiple software services are hosted 
on a single device, such as the two communication services, while on the other hand 
software components depend on multiple PAL components, such as the smart-meter 
and sensor software/firmware components. As we can see, the deployment sub model 
is conceptualized as a three-dimensional graph, indicating the relation between the 
PAL and SAL sub-models, where a node of each level may have dependencies to one 
or multiple nodes of the same or different level. 
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Fig. 4. PAL, SAL and deployment sub-models of the CTTP model of a smart metering system. 
A part of the assurance model of the smart metering system in our example is 
shown in Fig. 5. This model specifies threats for system components, assumptions 
affecting the manifestation of them, and the security controls that are used to mitigate 
the threats. The model shown in Fig. 5 is based on the protection profile for smart 
gateways specified in [30]. According to the part of the model shown in the figure, the 
smart metering system gateway is threatened by Time Modification, Local Data Dis-
closure, Resident Data and Privacy threats. For each of these threats, the model speci-
fies:(a)assumptions regarding the behavior of system components and actors that 
affect the manifestation of the threat (e.g. the assumption that system administrators 
are trusted - A.TrustedAdmins) - and (b) the security controls which are used to  miti-
gate the threats (e.g. the use of user authentication before any action - i.e. FIA. 
UAU.2). CTTP models of the form described above will provide the basis for generat-
ing training scenarios involving the simulation and/or emulation of cyber system 
components, attacks launched upon them, and the use of assessment and response 
tools. 
Based on the threats and parameters of the assurance model, for example, it will be 
possible to generate synthetic system events corresponding to the manifestation of 
attacks, feed them onto the emulated or simulated physical or software security con-
trols and observe their response to the simulated attacks. It will also be possible to 
check the ability of system actors to initiate and use the assessment tools in order to 
detect the attacks and/or assess the effectiveness of the responses of the security con-
trols, and generate training scenarios to explore the validity of assumptions and the 
impact of their potential violation (e.g., the possibility of having untrusted admin 
personnel, as opposed to the assumption A.TrustedAdmins in the assurance model of 
the smart metering system). The likelihood of a violation of this assumption could 
also be estimated through the statistical profiling of violation indicators (events) that 
are collected and analyzed by the assurance tool of the THREAT-ARREST platform. 
10 
 
Fig. 5. Assurance model of a smart metering system. 
4 Platform Architecture 
An initial conceptualization of the platform is shown in Fig. 6. As shown in the 
figure, the envisaged platform will comprise the following key components. 
 
Fig. 6. The THREAT-ARREST platform. 
11 
4.1 Assurance Tool 
The assurance tool supports the continuous assessment of the cyber system’s security 
through the combination of runtime monitoring and dynamic testing in order to pro-
vide information about the actual status. It also collects runtime system events and 
generates alerts that provide the basis for setting up realistic simulations. 
The assurance tool carries out a continuous runtime assessment of the aspects of 
the target cyber system that are important for CTTP training programme. These as-
pects are defined by the CTTP model (security assurance sub model). For example, 
the CTTP model defines the components of the cyber system that should be moni-
tored, the events of these components that are of importance (e.g. operating system 
calls, external service calls, user actions, etc.), and the conditions that should be satis-
fied by them. It also defines dynamic system tests that should be executed at runtime 
and should be combined with monitoring to form hybrid assessments of security [31], 
[32]. The collected monitoring events and testing outcomes form the operational sys-
tem evidence that is passed over to simulation component to enable statistical profil-
ing and thereby the generation of realistic simulations. 
 
4.2 Hybrid Training 
The CTTP models enable training scenarios based on hybrid combinations of simula-
tion and emulation training. In these scenarios, some of the components of the cyber 
system will be emulated and the rest will be simulated. This hybrid training mode is 
useful when emulating the entire system is not needed or is not feasible but hands-on 
experience is required for certain system components. In hybrid training scenarios, 
trainees will in general be expected to monitor, test and take actions on emulated 
components, and observe the effects of these actions to the rest of the cyber system 
following the propagation of these effects through simulation. Hybrid training scenar-
ios will also be useful in cases where the training process is divided in consecutive 
related parts. Each part may require that specific components should be emulated and 
the rest could be simulated in order to preserve system resources. Using a hybrid ap-
proach, the training platform will be able to terminate the emulation of specific com-
ponents and proceed with their simulation, as they will not be required for a certain 
part of the training, or choose to emulate components that used to me simulated in a 
previous part of the training phase. Overall, the training scenarios that will be sup-
ported by THREAT-ARREST will vary with respect to: 
─ The extent of system coverage: With regards to this criterion, scenarios may be 
distinguished into those involving attacks targeted to: (a) single components of a 
cyber-system, (b) clusters (i.e., subsets of interconnected) of components of a 
cyber-system, or (c) the whole set of components of a cyber-system. 
─ The type of attacks: With regards to this criterion, scenarios may be distinguished 
into those involving: (a) historic attacks, or (b) live attacks unfolding as the scenar-
io is simulated by the platform. 
─ The type of response required: With regards to this criterion, scenarios may be 
distinguished with regards to the type of response to a security incident that they 
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are aimed to train people for. Different types of response are typically defined in 
reference to the phase in the life cycle of an incident that they focus on. These, ac-
cording to [33], are: (a) preparation/preventive responses (i.e., actions whose aim is 
to prepare organizations for incident handling and/or prevention), (b) detection and 
analysis responses, (c) containment, eradication and recovery responses, or (d) 
post-incident responses. 
─ The trainee’s profile: With regards this criterion, scenarios may be distinguished 
with regards to the initial cognitive profile of the trainee, as obtained from the se-
curity games and the performance of the trainee in the training scenarios that 
he/she has been exposed so far. 
The allowed forms of variability along the above factors will be defined as part of 
scenarios forming a CTTP programme. The training tool will support the definition of 
CTTP models and programmes, the presentation of learning materials/exercises of 
CTTP programmes, enable trainee actions in response to cyber threats, interactions 
with simulated and/or emulated cyber system components, trainee performance eval-
uation, CTTP programme evaluation and adaptation. 
Beyond supporting the definition of CTTP models and programmes, the training 
tool will also ensure a high level of interactivity with the trainees and deliver the 
training scenarios, enabling them to respond, sending the appropriate commands to 
the emulated and simulated components. Also, it will continuously receive infor-
mation about the status of the emulation and simulation, evaluating in real time the 
state of progress based on user’s responses and their effects on the components and 
will determine the overall performance of the trainees. The tool will also be responsi-
ble for validating the assumptions of the assurance model based on the trainees’ re-
sponses to the training scenarios and generate warnings in case these assumptions are 
violated. It will also be able to assess the performance of trainees and evaluate and 
adapt CTTP programmes. Finally, the tool will collaborate with the visualization tool 
for the effective delivery of training. 
 
4.3 Gamification 
Beyond simulation, emulation and hybrid-based training, the CTTP model will also 
drive training based on games. This form of training will focus on developing skills to 
prevent attacks based on exploiting human factors (i.e., the users) of a cyber-system. 
The delivery of games based training will be driven by the assumptions of the assur-
ance sub-model, particular those that have to do with human users. Games will be 
used to test whether the assumptions made in an assurance model are plausible and to 
gradually improve the ability of human users to behave according to them. For in-
stance, if the target cyber system is equipped with a two-factor user authentication 
system, using passwords and security tokens, we can assume that the users will 
change the passwords frequently and abstain from sharing the security tokens. A pos-
sible game scenario will pose questions to the users based on these assumptions and 
their decisions will drive the training procedure. For example, users will be asked if 
they would share the security token in order to favor a person that gained their trust, 
simulating a phishing attack. Games will also be used to perform an initial profiling of 
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trainees in order to establish the form and level of additional types of training (and 
their difficulty) that would be beneficial for them. For example, a game may be used 
to test the familiarity of trainees with access controls and depending on it steer any 
follow up training towards, for example, emulation in order to give trainees a more 
hands-on exposure to access control. 
The gamification tool will host various serious games, scenarios and training eval-
uation mechanisms, which will enable trainees to develop skills in being resilient to 
and preventing social engineering attacks (e.g., phishing, impersonation attacks etc.). 
The games to be provided will be driven by the threats and assumptions specified in 
CTTP models (security assurance). 
Beyond providing serious games, the gamification will also support an initial cog-
nitive profiling of trainees and measure their familiarity with various security issues. 
This profile will be used in order to adjust the type and level of difficulty of the train-
ing process. Moreover, it will prompt the trainees to take part in serious games which 
test whether they behave according to the security assumptions and policies provided 
by the security assurance model of CTTP models. Their performance at these games 
will determine the unfolding of the scenarios and will have impact on the status of the 
emulated and simulated components. Furthermore, the tool will support post training 
assessments of trainee awareness (in terms of knowledge, attitudes and behavior) of 
these types of attacks that will be useful in tailoring other forms of CTTP training. 
 
4.4 Emulation 
Based on the CTTP model, it will be possible to emulate SAL and PAL components. 
Emulation will involve creating live instances of SAL and PAL components such as 
virtual machines, executing the services/operations available for them, and enabling 
data and stimuli flows using the network and deployment links connecting them in the 
SAL, PAL and deployment sub-models. In the smart metering system, for example, 
components that could be emulated in a CTTP programme include the Smart Meter 
command service and the security controls shown in Fig. 5. Emulation enables train-
ing scenarios where the behavior of certain SAL/PAL components cannot be de-
scribed in sufficient detail to enable the simulation of their behavior, or when hands-
on experience of trainees in observing and controlling components is necessary. 
In emulations, there will also be emulated clients of the cyber system requesting 
services from it and trainees will be required to interact with the emulated compo-
nents (e.g. log in the VMs) and perform certain operations in order to protect the rele-
vant components and through them wider parts of or the entire emulated cyber sys-
tem. For example, after logging onto a VM they will be able to use testing or monitor-
ing tools to detect an attack, analyze it and respond to it (e.g. deactivating some func-
tionality, strengthening access restrictions, etc.) in real time. Trainees may also be 
allocated to groups with responsibility of defending specific system components or 
even be given the role attackers to insight on how attacks can be launched. 
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4.5 Simulation 
The CTTP model will also enable the simulation of the propagation of the effects that 
attacks on some cyber system components would have on other parts of the system. 
For instance, the information provided by the CTTP model can be used for the simu-
lation of the propagation of a DDoS attack, targeting the smart gateway on our previ-
ous example, and its effects on the simulated hardware and software components. The 
propagation of such effects will be controlled by simulating the response mechanisms 
specified for SAL and PAL components and their capabilities and enabling data and 
other stimuli (e.g. calls) flow across components through the links of the SAL and the 
PAL sub-models. The effects of attacks may also be propagated from the PAL to the 
SAL layer (and vice versa) based on component links specified in the deployment 
model of the CTTP model. Simulations will vary with regards to the level of difficulty 
that they present to trainees. This level can be controlled by reducing the degree of 
information that is available for an attack, the time at which this information becomes 
available following an attack, and the consistency of information generated by the 
different cyber system security controls and the external assessment tools used. 
To ensure the provision of realistic simulations, the THREAT-ARREST frame-
work will continually monitor the real cyber system and log any events of importance 
related to it. The events to monitor and the types of analysis that will be applied to 
them will be defined by the assessment measures of the assurance sub-model. The 
captured assurance related events will be statistically profiled. Statistical profiling will 
cover event meta data (e.g. the timing of their occurrence and other characteristics 
such as their sender and receiver) and – where allowable by the applicable security 
policies – the actual event payload (e.g. data passed between components, parameter 
values of component operation calls, size of files read or written, etc.). 
 
4.6 Visualization Tool 
The visualization tool will enable the graphical representation of simulations and 
emulations, the effect of training actions on simulated and emulated systems as well 
as the status of the underlying components. 
Using the visualization platform, the framework’s operators will be able to select 
the desired training scenarios and tune their parameters. Moreover, this platform will 
be able to parse and visualize the CTTP model and the sub-models described in the 
previous sections and present the appropriate graphs to the users. The operators will 
utilize these graphs to select which parts of the cyber system should be simulated or 
emulated. The visualization platform is also responsible for the representation of the 
status of the simulated/emulated components and the effects of the training actions. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper presented the THREAT-ARREST solution – a platform for advanced 
cyber security training for medium to large organizations. At first, the organization’s 
real system is analyzed, revealing the most severe threats and vulnerabilities. Then, a 
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training programme is established which adheres to the organization’s specific needs. 
The various concepts are formed as CTTP models and the overall learning procedures 
are monitored and adapted at runtime. Except from the ordinary on-line educational 
material (e.g. lectures, tutorials, videos, etc.), the advanced hybrid training involves 
serious games as well as emulated/simulated scenarios. The overall approach can 
cover the training against known and new attack cases and prepares the trainer to be 
able to detect, respond, and mitigate them under realistic circumstances. 
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